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Coinciding with the release of a revised edition of The Limits of Neoliberalism: Authority, Sovereignty
and the Logic of Competition, previously reviewed on LSE RB in 2015, William Davies argues that the recent
surge in ‘populism’ must be understood in relation to the structures of political, cultural and moral economy, in
particular the inability of neoliberalism to sustain the myth of a level playing field or a sense of shared reality between
those who constantly ‘win’ and those who are set up to repeatedly ‘lose’.
Populism and the Limits of Neoliberalism
The surge in so-called ‘populism’ over the past year,
largely of a right-wing variety, has provoked an ongoing
debate as to how we should characterise its central
driver. To put this somewhat crudely (though not much
more crudely than some of the debate’s protagonists),
the choice comes down to a simple binary: economics
or culture? Class or identity? An awkward new category
of ‘the left behind’ has emerged in political discourse to
capture the unexpected supporters of Donald Trump,
Brexit, Marine Le Pen and other nationalist
movements.
This debate cannot be resolved on these terms, for one
simple reason. The economy is cultural: class and
identity constitute each other. This is why the
perspective known as ‘cultural economy’ (or ‘cultural
political economy’) is now more valuable than ever, if it
can illuminate the ways in which markets, property
rights, work and consumption produce distinctive
identities and affects, not as side-effects or as false
consciousness, but as integral components of how they
operate.
For example, welfare reforms over recent years do not
simply operate with a cold logic of efficiency, which has
the unfortunate side effect of making people feel
responsible for their own inactivity and suffering. That
feeling of responsibility is internal to how they work, and
therefore to the broader project of fiscal and labour
market reform.
The deep resentment that has become visible in rural, ex-industrial and ex-mining regions in Europe and the United
States was a surprise to many people, but to comprehend it, two things are essential. Firstly, we need to accept that
it has most likely been brewing for many years, but without an adequate outlet. Secondly, that it is cultural-economic
and, I would argue, moral-economic (for reasons I will explore in a moment).
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The research for my book The Limits of Neoliberalism: Authority, Sovereignty and the Logic of Competition  was
conducted over 2007-10, meaning that it did not address much of the long aftermath of the global financial crisis,
including austerity in Europe, and did not explicitly anticipate the political fallout of 2016. There are, however, a
couple of ways in which I hope the book can support the type of cultural-economic and moral-economic enquiry that
I think is needed right now, which I outline in the new Introduction written in September 2016.
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First of all, the book treats ‘neoliberalism’ as a devotedly anti-political project, albeit one that can only be advanced
by the state, producing various paradoxes as a result. It is anti-political in the sense that its intellectual framers
(such as the Chicago School) shared a pessimistic view of political life, in which deliberation collapses into
misunderstanding and ultimately violence.
By contrast, economic calculation (including the price system of the market, but also the various techniques of
measurement and audit that characterise contemporary governance) is viewed as safer, more transparent and more
honest. Hence, I define neoliberalism as the ‘disenchantment of politics by economics’. In my account, neoliberalism
is less about the promotion of markets than a certain style of technocracy.
There are various reasons why this project cannot fully succeed, not least that it is executed by sovereign agencies,
whose full power and authority is not reducible to economic logic. But I think populism indicates another reason: this
economisation of public life creates a vacuum and a longing for something other than technocracy and efficiency.
We need to avoid romanticising politics, and recognise that this longing can manifest itself in some ugly ways. In that
respect, we need also to recognise some of the value in the neoliberal position: politics can and does authorise
violence.
However, the sudden jolt of Brexit and Trump is partly due to identities, voices and needs being ignored or
disenfranchised for so long that the desire for political agency became overwhelming. Populist agendas are
condemned by mainstream voices as ‘unrealistic’ or even as ‘post-truth’. Yet – as my book details – neoliberal
government involves careful delineation of what counts as ‘economic reality’, overseen by certain schools of
economic expertise but not others. Where economic policy and regulation are concerned, stipulating what is ‘true’ is
an important function of the technocrat. It is no surprise that a rebellion against this will be characterised by an
apparent refusal of certain notions of truth, especially when those notions are as abstract as macroeconomics.
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The second major contribution of the book, I hope, is to focus attention on the moral-economic logic of
neoliberalism, which makes competition the basic normative principle of society and competitiveness the ultimate
individual and collective virtue. Crucially, this logic is not limited to the sphere of market exchange, but is treated as
a moral and political rationality that can be extended into all spheres of life, such as urban governance, education
reform and personal responsibility. The prevalence of league tables, coaching, branding and auditing in various non-
market domains is testimony to this.
Competition exerts moral force, because it stipulates that victors will have earned their rewards (as the ideal of
‘meritocracy’ proposes), but also that others will have earned their failure. Viewed from within the neoliberal
framework, those regions, cultures, individuals now routinely known as the ‘left behind’ are not simply unfortunate or
inefficient: they are less morally worthy because they are less competitive. The competitive ‘game’ that the state has
been enforcing since the 1970s has revealed them to be losers.
The success of talent shows over the past fifteen years gives a glimpse of the moral framework of neoliberalism. For
while those programmes are ostensibly about identifying ‘winners’, they do so through a steady stream of
eliminations, often featuring emotional outbursts from the losers. It is one thing to suffer a misfortune or to choose a
less ambitious path in life. But psychologically and morally, it is quite another to inhabit a society where ‘success’
and ‘failure’ are constantly being fought over, and another thing again to be constantly saddled with the latter.
The emotional and political outbursts of the past year only make any sense if this is carefully reflected on, not only in
terms of economics but in terms of political, cultural and moral economy. One of the ‘limits of neoliberalism’ is its
inability to carry on producing the sense of a ‘level playing field’, as inequality mounts up and becomes reproduced
via intergenerational mechanisms. Another, as we’ve now discovered, is the inability to maintain a sense of shared
‘reality’ amongst those repeatedly ‘winning’ and those repeatedly ‘losing’, especially where the latter are a growing
majority.
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